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Introduction
For Iran, the nineteenth century, particularly its second half, is
usually thought of as a period of economic stagnation, if not decline.
The growing political and economic domination of Iran by Britain and
Russia and the weak, corrupt and increasingly exploitative Qajar rule,

which could not effectively resist foreign demands, are generally considered
the basic causes of this stagnation.

1

In contrast to this period, the years

after the coup d'etat of 1921, when the relatively strong central government
embarked on a series of administrative, legal and economic reforms, are
viewed as the beginning of the modern economic development of Iran.

In this

essay we shall try to show that the break between the two periods is not as
sharp as generally believed and that the ability of the central government
to carry out its refonns was based upon fundamental economic transformations
that had been occurring in Iran as the result of the West's economic penetration of the country.

2

The main thesis of the paper is that between the

ascension of Nasir-al-Din Shah to the throne (1848) and the constitutional
revolution (1906-1911), the pre-mercantile and fragmented economy of Iran
gradually became integrated not only into the international economy but also
internally.

3

Since these developments took place under the commercial impact

of the industrial powers, the internal integration did not mean a parallel
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expansion in both industry and agriculture.

On the contrary, competition

from Western manufactured goods ruined much of the domestic industry.

By

the end of the period, Iran was still very much a pre-capitalist so~iety,
but it exhibited many of the characteristics of a market economy.

Since the

expansion of Iran's exports was chiefly in agricultural products, the spread
of commercialization was probably most conspicuous in the rural areas.

Thus

it was in an economy with a relatively advanced state of commercial exchange,
implying considerable regional specialization and interdependence, that the
government after the coup was able to establish a reasonably efficient central
bureaucracy and army to carry out its reforms.
This paper is primarily about the structural changes that took place
in the rural areas, such as the rise of cash crops, the relative loss of
economic autonomy of villages, changes in the pattern of land ownership and
the creation of wage labor.

However, in order to appreciate these develop

ments, it is essential to set them in the wider context of the overall economic
change in the country.

In particular, it is useful to clear up certain mis

conceptions responsible for the common belief in the economic stagnation and
decline of Iran during the nineteenth century.

In the first section of the

paper, therefore, we re-examine the arguments and evidence purporting to
show the general deterioration in economic conditions.

Th·e second part is

more specifically devoted to a description of the structural transformation
of the rural areas and the expansion of a market economy in Iran.

A brief

concluding section discusses the implications of these developments for the
reforms instituted after 1921.

In the Appendix, we outline a few of the

problems met encountered in sources when writing on the economic history of Iran.
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I
It is generally maintained that the economic disintegration of Iran in
the second half of the nineteenth century is reflected in its chronic excess
of imports over exports and the resulting difficulties with balance of
payments, a constantly depreciating currency, the rising level of prices and
-

the unfavorable movements in terms of trade (the relative price of a nation's
exports and imports).

Large sections of the population, particularly the

peasantry, it . is argued, were adversely affected by these deve 1opments. 4
Although the various economic ills of the country are usually blamed
on the incompetence and avarice of the ruling class, the rulers should not
be held responsible for all these misfortunes; certainly, such factors as
the adverse movements in terms of trade or the currency depreciation due to
the fall in the international price of silver were beyond their control.

Nor

is it obvious that the burden of inflation (even if it can be shown that there
was much price increase) was borne directly by the mass of the population.
The vast majority of the poorer segments of the population were peasants
living in relatively self-sufficient villages and, therefore, immune to
the evils of inflation.

Because land taxes were fixed in money teI111s and

because the peasantry did not possess significant monetary assets and were
in fact net debtors, they might even have benefitted from inflation when
price increases eroded the real value of their liabilities.

We do not wish

to assert that Qajar rule was not oppressive and arbitrary nor that the
government always pursued economic policies beneficial to the country.
Neither do we believe that the common man enjoyed an adequate standard of
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living.

Rather, our aim in this section of the paper is to scrutiniz e

the evidence to see if it is reliable and to determine whether the usual
inference s logically follow.
For many, the most obvious indicatio n of the economic bankruptc y of Iran
is the imbalance in its foreign trade.

Contempo rary observers consisten tly

estimate imports to exceed exports and claim that the differenc e was covered
partly by the export of specie. 5

The outflow of precious metals was cer-

tainly considere d an evil, detriment al to industry, trade and the prosperit y
of the country.

Iranian governmen ts often imposed bans on the export of

gold and even prohibite d the outflow of silver coins at times when it was
necessary to reduce the volume of Iran's imports, such as during the period
of the sudden decline in silk output. 6

Of course, it is hard to imagine how

such regulatio ns could be effective ly enforced.

The magnitude of the foreign

trade deficit of Iran is difficult to establish , and it is harder yet to
measure the extent, or even the direc.tion , of the movement of specie.

Until

the end of the nineteent h century, when Belgian officials were put in charge
of the customs administr ation, data on the visible trade of Iran are scanty
and unreliabl e--the earlier practice of farming out the customs revenue was
not, for obvious reasons, conducive to accurate reporting . 7

Other evidence

suggests that, whether or not the commodity trade was unbalance d, the deficit
must have been covered by transactio ns other than the outflow of gold and
silver.

In order to remit Iranian silver currency to pay for imports of

goods, such direct transfers had to be cheaper than carrying out payments
through the purchase of sterling bills of exchange on London.

Taking the

period of 1863 to 1921, we find that in only eight years was the intrinsic
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value of the Kran, that is, the gold value of its silver content, above its
Pound Sterling exchange rate.

Only in those years would it have been profit

able to export specie to purchase Pounds in London.

When one considers the

higher cost of movements of metal than the charges for payments through bills
of exchange, it is not clear that there would have been large net outward
movements of Iranian silver currency even in those eight years. 8

(Normally

it would have been cheaper to use the silver Kran in Iran to buy bills of
exchange on London or other financial centers.)

To encounter no net outflow

of specie is not surprising for the years after 1890, when foreign investments,
loans to the government, remittances of Iranian workers in Russia and foreign
military expenditures in Iran were financing the trade deficit.

We are led,

however, to conclude that, since in the earlier years Iran did not have sub
stantial net invisible exports or capital inflow, the trade imbalance must
have been smaller than is commonly believed. 9
The most reasonable explanation, corroborated by contemporary observers,
is that Iran's imports were overstated and its exports were underestimated.
The main factor in the over-assessment of imports was the estimation of their
value according to merchants' prices rather than by what the importers had in
10
fact paid.
Importers had little incentive to undervalue their goods in
order to lower customs dues since these were often fixed by mule loads or
some other quantity measure rather than assessed according to the five percent
ad valorem rate.

Under-reporting of exports was widespread, and its extent

probably considerable.

The prevalence of smuggling is the most obvious

explanation for the unreliability of export figures.

Lucrative opportunities

existed for smuggling subsidized Russian products back into Russia.

There
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was also periodically large illicit trade in foodstuffs, especially grains,
whose export was often banned after mid-century whenever there were food
shortages.

11

Another possible cause of·the underestimation of exports may

be the failure to include transport costs to the border in the value of goods.
Since these costs could be quite high, especially prior to the 1890's, a
downward bias might have been introduced in the data.
Even if substantial quantities of specie were not being exported,
during much of this period there was undeniably, as J • Rabino puts it,
permanent dearth of currency." 12

11

a

Despite Rabino 's claim, it is improbable

that the scarcity was caused by hoarding.

Chronic public deficits did not

allow the government to save any money out of its revenue.
Iranian ruling class known for its frugal ways.

Nor was the

The only people in possession

of liquid funds were the merchants, and they were unlikely to leave their
money idle.

A more plausible explanation is that the acutely felt shortage

was the reflection of the growing need for widely accepted instruments of
payments to finance the _expansion of trade (which we shall discuss more
fully below).

Not only were the number and volume of commercial transactions

growing, but they were increasingly directed to the national and the inter
national markets.

Demand for money was rising, and local credit arrangements

to facilitate internal trade did develop to some extent, even in the absence
of a central monetary authority.

Until the Imperial Bank of Persia was

established, the scope of such credit and clearing arrangements was limited,
and except in a few cases such as that of Haji Amin-0-Zarb, the bills of
Iranian merchants and aoneylenders were not widely acceptable or readily
negotiable.

Inevitably in such a situation, part of the larger demand for
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money had to be met from increased circulation of the silver currency of
the country.

Therefore, the perceived scarcity must have been relative to

the growing need of the expanding trade of the country, rather than a con
sequence of a constant outward drain of specie.

At times, statements about

shortages of silver currency and the unavailability of good bills on Europe
reflected Iran's real periodic difficulties in paying for her imports. 13
Recurrent complaints were to be expected and were evidence of the equili
brating mechanism for balancing and foreign trade of the country, which was
highly sensitive to such natural factors as the state of the harvest or the
occurrence of famines and epidemics.

Transfers of specie set in motion com

pensating forces to adjust temporary trade imbalances--it was the gold standard
in its pure form at work.
Numerous authors have argued that the depreciation of the Iranian
currency--that is, the declining gold or Pound Sterling value of the Kran-was due either to balance of payments deficits or currence debasement. 14
It is true that between 1848 and 1914, the Kran fell from 22.5 kran per
Pound Sterling to about 56 kran per Pound Sterling. 15

Prior to this period,

debasement had been the major cause of the declining value of the Kran; yet,
there was only one minor reduction in the official silver content of the Kran
during these years.

Clearly, the government had no incentive to debase the

currency, since ultimately, devaluation would only hurt its own finances be
cause of the fixed monetary value of taxes.

As one would expect, cheating

did occur in the provincial mints, but because such tampering was generally
considered harmful to national coonnerce, minting was centralized in 1877 to
ensure a uniform currency.

17

As we have already noted, no less an authority
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on the Iranian currency than J. Rabino shows that the Kran often connnanded
a premium, selling at a rate above that which the gold equivalent of its
official silver content would justify.

18

This is hardly to be expected from

a currency that was constantly being debased.

Needless to say, the officials

of the British-owned Imperial Bank of Persia had a vested interest in blaming
Iranian authorities for the alleged irregularities in the administration of
the monetary system.

19

Since Iran was in effect on the silver standard,

the exchange value of its currency was simply determined by the international
price of s·ilver.

Depreciation, then, had nothing to do with debasement, the

commercial and financial policies of the government, or the alleged trade
deficit of the country.

The decline in the exchange rate of the Kran in

terms of Pound Sterling, since the latter was tied to gold, was the natural
consequence of the falling international price of silver, especially after
the 1880 's.
Whatever its cause, the depreciation of the currency, it is maintained
"constituted a severe and indirect tax that hit the poor particularly ••••

1120

The mechanism by which the depreciation affected the peasants is not clearly
specified, but it was supposedly inflation, which was not matched by an
equal increase in wage.

21

Inflation, which was to some extent caused by the

declining exchange rate, could not per se be responsible for the deterioration
in the standard of living of the poor.

If wages did not rise as much as

the general level of prices, the cause must be sought in factors other than
the falling value of the Kran.

22

The mass of the population, which was

primarily rural, even at the end of the century, might have been adversely
affected by price changes insofar as the terms of trade moved against them.
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McDaniel and Issawi, both citing the fall in the world prices of agricultural
products from 1873 to the mid-1890's, have claimed such a reduction in the
real income of the general population, especially the peasantry.

23

Whether

in fact the terms of trade became unfavorable for Iran is a debatable issue
which we shall ex.amine more fully below.

Our earlier discussion of the causes

of exchange rate devaluation has shown that, whatever change there might have
been in the relative prices of agricultural to industrial goods, it was un
related to currency depreciation.
When considering the measurement of the rate of inflation and of the
deterioration in living conditions, it is necessary to recall that evidence
concerning price changes in Iran is scanty and highly unreliable.

Given the

fragmented structure of the economy, the use of isolated price data, seen in
McDaniel, to show any general movements in prices, is of doubtful validity.
Not only were there large seasonal and regional price differences, especially
for bulky commodities such as grains, but the history of the period is
characterized by wide price fluctuations due to natural or economic factors.
As late as 1890, regional price differences of over 300 percent were not
unconnnon for grain.

24

In 1910, bread and grain in Mashad fluctuated by over

50 percent between summer and winter.

25

Napier reports that during the 1871-

1872 famine, grain was selling at 4 Krans/man in Shirvan, while at the time
of his visit (1874), it had fallen to 5 man/Krans, one-twentieth of its
previous price.

26

Nevertheless, it appears that in the 1890's and the early

years of the twentieth century, domestic prices and wages were generally
higher.

We doubt, however, that these changes can be measured, even roughly,

by an index to determine whether prices rose significantly more than wages.

27
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Statements concerning declining real wages are not, therefore, based on
even remotely objective measures but upon comparisons between travellers'
accounts from the early nineteenth century and those of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries.

28

The validity of such conclusions is highly

questionable because of the doubtful impartiality of such descriptions and,
more importantly, because of the systematic biases which must have tainted
the vantage point of the later observers as the difference between European
and Iranian living standards widened over the course of the century.

29

Clearly, though, our evidence does not allow us to reach the opposite con
clusion that there was an improvement in the welfare of the masses, who, even
lllltil much later, lived in miserable conditions.

In the second section of

the paper, we do show that the availability of certain simple articles of
consumption was more widespread than is sometimes maintained.
Arriving at a judgement about the impact of changes in the terms of
trade upon the well-being of the population is not a less complex task.
Firstly, the decline in world prices of primary products relative to prices
of manufactured goods is not an unequivocally established fact.

30

Secondly,

it is not clear that the relative price of primary to industrial goods,
usually measured by the. relative price of United Kingdom exports to exports,
is the appropriate terms of trade for Iran.

Iran's imports of agricultural

produce consisted of specialty goods such as opium, dried fruits, silk and
gums, in addition to the staples, cotton, grain and wool.

Changes in the

prices of some of these goods, notably opium and silk, do not appear to
follow closely the general trend in agricultural prices.

In the absence of

continuous price series, we have to rely on the scattered data presented in
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Table 1, which shows the price of opium in the city of Mashad.

(For the

sake of a consistent comparison, we have not included the data for other
years which were available only for other locations.)
Table 1
Price of Opium Per Shah Man in Mashad, in Pound Sterling

1870

1883

1889

6.0

4.6

8.0

Source:

YE AR S
1890
1901
6.5

1902

1903

1904

1905

3.3

4.0

5.0

6.7

4.3

Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Various Diplomatic and Con
sular Reports.

Information on silk prices is even more difficult to obtain; hence, we have
chosen to indicate the general trend in the price of this commodity by
examining the export price of Chinese raw silk, which must have followed
a similar pattern to that of Iranian silk.
Table 2
Average Export Price of Chinese Silk in Dollars/1000 Piculs of Raw Silk
1870-74
700
Source:

1

75-'79
470

1

80- 1 84

'85-'89

'90~'94

430

400

420

1

95-'99

1900-1904

'05-'09

'10-'14

560

710

800

760

D. K. Lieu, The Silk Industry of China (Shanghai:

1941).

The conclusion we can draw from these figures is that the fall of the prices
of silk and opium was not as substantial as the general decline in agricultural
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prices and that by the beginning of the twentieth century, when they were
both important export items, their prices had recovered to levels equal to
or even higher than those prevailing in the pre-depression era.

The situation

is not surprising since the fall in the prices of agricultural staples was
partly caused by the expansion of cultivation in the thinly populated "New
World," which was not suited to the production of such labor-intensive crops.
Finally, Iran itself was a large importer of agricultural products such
as tea and sugar and would have benefitted, as far as these items were con
cerned, from a fall in agricultural prices.

In the following table we attempt

to show the magnitude of the price movement for the three largest imports of
Iran.

Although these are not the prices that prevailed in Iran, the latter

must have exhibited similar trends.

The table certainly demonstrates sig

nificant declines in the prices of Iran's principal imports.

The existence

and size of such declines may invalidate statements regarding unfavorable
movements in the terms of trade of the country.

The verification of such

assertions must await the construction of a systematic index of the terms of
trade for Iran, which would be outside the scope of the present paper.
Closely related to the issues of terms of trade, price fluctuations
and currency depreciation is the change in the volume of the external trade
of the country.

Our interest in measuring the expansion of trade stems from

its direct relevance to the spread of commercialization, the focus of the
second section of this study.

Since actual quantity data are seldom avail

able, there has been a tendency to measure mo~ements in the volume of trade
in terms of some foreign exchange and indirectly, then, in terms of gold.
Using such a standard, Entner has shown that Russo-Persian trade surpassed
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Table 3
Prices of Major Imports of Iran

T ea

Aver age Indian
Export Price in
Pound Sterling/lb.
Years

s ugar
Average wholesale
price of sugar in
London, shillings
per cwt.

Textiles and
Fib ers 31
Board of Trade
wholesale price
index, 1900=100

1870-74

.088

23.60

156.40*

1875-79

.091

21. 00

134. 96

1880-84

.070

18.80

150.05

1885-89

.049

13.30

103.56

1890-94

.052

13.10

97.48

1895-99

.052

9,80

85.38

1900-04

.031

9.30

100.04

1905-09

• 028

9. 80

93,68

1910-15

.032

11.15

127. 7

*Average for the years 1871-74.
Source:

B. R. Mitchell, Abstract of British Historical Statistics
(Cambridge: 1962); N. Deerr, The History of Sugar (London:
1949); Great Britain, Board of Trade, Statistical Abstract
for the Several Colonial and Other Possessions of the United
Kingdom (London: 1865-1905), later called Statistical Abstract
for the British Self-Governing Dominions, Colonies, Possessions
and Protectorates (London: 1904-1918), various volumes.
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its 1830 level only after 1880, and thus argues that the Treaty of Turkamanchai was not effective in promoting trade between the two nations. 32
The decline in Russo-Persian trade during the 1830 1 s can easily be explained
by the plague epidemic of 1830-1831, which, it is claimed, killed about one
third to one-half of the population of the Caspian region.

The real volume

of trade must have exceeded its 1830 level long before 1880, and contentions
to the contrary reflect the mistaken view that gold value of trade somehow
estimates the quantity of trade, whereas it is merely an alternative measure
of its value.

Since prices were generally falling between 1830 and 1880, the

gold value of the level of trade underestimates the real growth in the quantity
of trade during this period; moreover, the biases introduced by the use of
value of trade in terms of gold are not confined to the years 1830 to 1880.
The declining trend of prices continued until about 1895 and reversed itself
for the two decades following that year. 33

The usual measures of the level

of trade are, therefore, likely to underestimate expansion of voltune of trade
in the last two decades of the century and to exaggerate its increase after
1895.
Professor Issawi has attempted to measure the growth in the quantum
of trade using, in the absence of more suitable data, price deflators of
British exports and imports; according to his evaluation, between the 1850's
and 1914, the real volume of trade quadrupled. 34

This procedure, rather

than Entner's method, is the correct way to assess the change in the quantity
index of trade.
too low.

Still, we suspect that Professor Issawi's estimate may be

Two factors we have already mentioned are probably the main causes

of the downward bias in the figures.

One is the relative importance of

agricultural goods in Iran's imports, and the decline in their index was
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larger than that of general British exports.

Second, the rise in smuggling

relative to the total trade grew with the government's increasing tendency
to impose embargos on the exports of foodstuffs.

Our position concerning

the existence of such biases in Professor Issawi's estimates involves con
jecture, and we do not believe that it would be possible to construct a
reasonably exact quantity index of trade to measure the changes with greater
precision.
From the discussions in this section, it should be clear that a number
of the conmon explanations of the stagnation and decay of the Iranian economy
are based on erroneous analysis, while other draw upon evidence which is, at
best, ambiguous.

As we have emphasized, we do not subscribe to the view that

in the second half of the nineteenth century Iran enjoyed a period
growth--a position which would be patently false.

of dynamic

Others might consider the

changes we describe and analyze in the following section as the symptoms of
Iran's increasing economic dependence on the West rather than of economic
progress.

Yet, whether these structural modifications could be considered

as capitalist development will not be our primary concern.

Still, it is

unreasonable to describe these changes as retrogressions or to argue that
the circumstances surrounding their occurrence were those of general decline.
These transformations did gradually enable the State to take a more active
part in the formulation of economic policies.

II

A number of social and economic historians of Iran have at tempted to
divide Iranian history into periods and to analyze its developments in terms
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of such historical stages and categories as feudalism or the Asiatic mode
of production and oriental despotism. 35

Without joining the controversy

over historical periodization in Iran, we would argue that whether or not
Qajar Iran may be classified as feudal or Asiatic or some variation thereof,
it is useful to think of it as a pre~mercantile society which was gradually
transformed into a market economy.

We are primarily concerned with the

extension of commodity exchange relations and how this development modified
the existing economic and social structure.

We are aware that the course

of such structural transformations is partly determined by the characteristics
of the society in which they occur.

As Marx maintained,

Commerce, therefore, has a more or less dissolving
influence everywhere on the producing organization,
which it finds at hand and whose different forms are
mainly carried on with a view of use value. To what
extent it brings about the dissolution of the old mode
of production depends on its solidarity and internal
structure. And whither this process of dissolution will
lead, in other words, what new mode of production will
replace the old, does not depend on commerce, but on
the character of the old mode of production itself.3 6
An understanding of the pre-existing structure, is therefore, essential for
a complete analysis of the development that occurred in Iran--hence, the
relevance and importance of the historical controversy mentioned above.
However, the pace of the spread of markets, the reaction of the various
segments of the society to changes in their traditional roles and the
emergence of some specific forms rather than others, all issues central
to the debate, will not be our concern here.

The remainder of this paper

is confined to a description of the nature and the extent of the expansion
of commercial relations in Iran, especially in its rural areas.
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Perhaps the concept of non-market or pre-mercantile society needs some
explanation.

In a non-market economy, in its pure form, economic organiza

tion, the social division of labor and the exchange of products and services
is based upon cuatom and/or command by a central authority.
such systems exhibited several salient common traits:

Historically,

for example, produc

tion was for use value, irrespective of whether or not each producer was the
ultimate consumer of the product, and economic surplus was extracted directly
either in the fonn of goods or various types of labor services.

In the absence

of cheap transportation and communication, regional specialization was limited,
and in general a close correspondence existed between each region's production
and its consumption.

Because of the restricted sphere of exchange, institu

tions to facilitate trade were poorly developed.
In contrast, production in a market economy is for exchange rather than
for the immediate use of the producer; surplus extraction is indirect through
cash rents or taxes, and considerable regional specialization occurs, neces
sitating trade betw~en regions.

Relatively large movements of goods allow

the concentration of the economic surplus, which can be used to maintain an
efficient central bureaucracy and anny.

The prevalence of commodity exchange

requires elaborate legal and economic institutions concerning property rights,
enforcement of contracts, a widely accepted medium of exchange, and, even
tually, negotiable credit instruments.

Clearly, this summary offers only

a highly abstract and simplified framework to analyze even a limited sphere
of economic activity.

We shall elaborate on these concepts and discuss the

complexities that may occur in any actual situation in the context of the
description of the historical structural change in Iran that follows.

The
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theoretical categorie~ above are not definitely dichotomous, and no sharp
line~ divide these two types of economic organization.

As a pre-mercantile

economy is transfonned into a market economy, the dominant institutions and
structure of the former are gradually replaced by those characterizing the
latter.

37

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Iran, especially in the
rural areas, exhibited many of the dominant characteristics of a pre
mercantile economy.

Of course, during the Safavid rule, the country had

enjoyed considerable amounts of internal exchange and trade, but the political
and military events of the second half of the eighteenth century had left the
economy in a fragmented state.

The salient features of the economic struc

ture of the country may be sunmarized as follows.

The population was largely

rural, and nomadic tribes constituted about one-half of the total.

The degree

of self-sufficiency of the peasant and nomadic communities is suggested by
the small share of agricultural products in the export trade as compared to
their dominant role later in the nineteenth century.

Iran exported raw and

manufactured silk, cotton cloth, spices, dyes, drugs, pearls, wheat, skins
and livestock.

In return, it imported velvets, woolen and cotton cloth,

spices, dyes, metals, watches and clocks, brocades, lace and gold thread,
guns and gunpowder, glassware and mirrors.
Three aspects of the pattern of the foreign trade of Iran are noteworthy
as indications of the fragmented state of the economy.

Firstly, even though

precise figures are not available, the volume of luxury articles for the
consumption of the wealthy seems to have been substantial; exchange was not
yet undertaken to satisfy the needs of the general population.

Secondly,
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such traditional items of long-distance trade as spices, dyes and drugs,
which usually are the first products exchanged among regions irrespective
of the degree of division of labour and development of markets within each
area, figured prominently in the external comnerce of the country.

Thirdly,

a sizable part of Iran's imports was ultimately for re-export to other
countries, primarily Afghanistan and the Ottoman Empire, which at this time
were its main trading partners.

The location of the country on a trading

route, rather than its own internal economic structure, partly determined
the volume of its foreign dealings.
The low level of integration of the internal markets is also suggested
by the lack of an adequate monetary system,

Though there was supposedly

a uniform metallic currency, minting was farmed out and decentralized;
during the reign of Fath'Ali Shah, for example, the silver Kran was minted
in thirty-one localities.

Such a system obviously lent itself to abuse and

resulted in disparities between coins minted in different cities,

A wide

variety of foreign coins circulated mostly in border cities and areas, but
such coins were probably not generally acceptable other than by merchants
.
. hforeign
commerce. 38
connected wit
Despite several attempts at reform, fiscal administration remained
basically unchanged until the constitutional revolution, providing further
evidence of the limited sphere of market exchange in Iran.

The existence

of tax farming, the prevalence of taxes in kind, either in produce or in
provision of military service, and the widespread use of Tuyuls (the assignments of the taxes of a particular village or area to individuals in return
for services rendered or simply as gifts bestowed upon favorites of the
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court

point to an economic structure divided into many independent units.

The inability of the central government to maintain a reasonably efficient
bureaucracy or a regular army paid from its general revenue was the result of
its incapacity to concentrate and centralize revenue collection.

A large

portion of the tax revenue of each province was used to defray local expendi
ture.

A relatively small part of what remained was actually remitted to the

capital and thus actually passed through the central treasury.

Expenses in

curred by the central government were often paid for by drafts (barats) on the
revenue of various provinces.

Such government bills often sold at a large

discount not only because of costs involved in collecting such claims but
also because of the uncertainty of their acceptance by provincial governors
who might have at times felt in a position to defy the authority of the central
government.

40

Centrifugal forces stemming from the relative economic, admini-

strative and military independenc e of each region resisted attempts at cen
tralizing reforms; only the existence of factional rivalries in each region
enabled the government to assert some limited authority arid to prevent even
further disintegrat ion.

41

The extremely complex land tenure system, closely related to the land
revenue administrat ion, was also a distinct manifestati on of the undeveloped
state of commercial relations and markets.

Complicated and diverse systems

for division of agricultura l products prevailed.

Sharecroppi ng, which has

not totally disappeared even today, was not simply a matter of apportionin g
the output between the landlord and tenant but involved claims by people
who provided community services as, for instance, bath attendants or village
craftsmen, and by others who held certain offices like village guard (dashtban),

I
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village headman (kadkhuda) and mullah. 42

Resort to such direct methods of

payment as immediate division of crops rather than monetary renumeration
was the natural consequence of a limited system of market exchange.

In

addition to a share in the harvest, landlords exacted from the peasantry
extensive personal services which varied substantially according to local
customs.

43

The complexity of the system, direct expropriation of the surplus and
the not-infrequent resort to coercion required local presence of landlords;
therefore, they had to reside near their property.

Absentee landholders

were not unknown-especially among very powerful members of the ruling class

who often acquired their property through the exercise of influence while
holding political office or through the grants of tuyuls. 44

Bailiffs

(mobashers) were appointed to gather the revenue, but controlling these
overseers themselves was not easy.

The consumption of surplus had to occur

largely in or near the locality where it was produced.
Despite our emphasis on the rudimentary state of market exchange in
Iranian society, it must be admitted that the concept of private property
and procedures for enforcement of contracts were well developed, at least
theoretically, within the tradition of Islamic jurisprudence.

In particular,

the institution of private property in land was widespread, although property
rights were not absolute nor always very secure.

The inadequacy of the land

registration system, possibilities for forgery of documents, and the arbitrary
nature of political power were responsible for this instability. 45

Nonethe

less, land transactions were known and landed property could be used as
collateral on loans.

Abbas Mirza makes several references in his will to
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various villages he had purchased, and land deals involving sales to
members of both the merchant and ruling classes can be cited. 46

However,

these transactions could not have been widespread since the lack of liquidity
would have limited large purchases of this sort.

Merchants, almost the only

people in possession of liquid funds, were unlikely to invest a significant
portion of their assets in agricultural land.

As long as the means of commu

nication remained primitive, they had to buy land in the vicinity of their
place of residence.

Geographical proximity was essential not only for the

assessment of the value of the land but also for its continued and profitable
exploitation.

In a situation where the surplus from the land was in the form

of an elaborate division of the crops and a maze of personal services,
reasonable evaluation of the real worth of any property would have been
difficult except for those who had an intimate knowledge of local customs. 47
Early in the century, then, the merchant class still probably favored invest
ment in urban real estate.
This brief description of the main features of the economic structure
of Iran oversimplifies a complex reality.

No doubt vast regional differences

existed with regard to such matters as natural resources,' accessibility to
major trade routes, the extent of division of labor, the degree of commer
cialization, the land revenue system, and specific achniniStrative, legal
and political institutions.

This caveat notwithstanding, we think it useful

to go beyond heterogeneity to emphasize the common features of the regions
because our main aim (in the discussion that follows) is to stress the
similarities in the pattern of transformation that occurred after mid-century.
Although the direction of change in each region was such as to integrate it
into a more unified system, many local differences did not necessarily
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diminish and were even accentuated; indeed, regional disparities in the
standard of living were probably less marked than they subsequently became.
When interregional exchange was limited, the economic structures of the
various provinces were alike because each region had to provide for a large
part of its own needs.

Consequently, the cropping pattern within each area

was more diversified than we observe later, and there was wider geographical
distribution of production manufacturing.
The reign of Nasir-Ad-Din Shah may be viewed as a period during which
the structure of the economy, especially in the rural sector, was fundamentally
altered.

The pace of change accelerated in the last decades of the nineteenth

century and the early years of the present century until it came to a tem
porary halt beeause of political disruptions caused by the constitutional
revolution, the First World War and the military occupation of parts of the
country by foreign forces, both prior to and during the War.

Over the 60-year

period between 1850 and 1910, the dominant economic characteristics of Iran
became those of a market economy, and the features of the pre-mercantile era
began to disappear.

Much of this transformation occurred under the impact of

the economic expansion of the industrial countries, often at their initiative
and urged on by their political pressure, rather than through a process of
internal development.

As a result the rural sector became integrated into·

a network of internal and international trade, while the urban areas became
more and more centers of commerce and administration as their manufacturing
activities were partly ruined through competition from cheap Western indus
trial goods.

Total destruction was averted perhaps by the ability of the

handicrafts sectors to adapt somewhat to the new conditions and to change
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their product mix.
Though relatively minor, demographic transition over the course of the
nineteenth century conforms to the pattern of change which we claim occurred
during the period.

The end of the century found the population still largely

rural but the relative size of the nomadic population had fallen as had the
rural-urban population ratio.

In 1900, about 79 percent of the population

lived in the rural areas, a ratio which was to drop only about one further
percentage point until 1940.

The nomadic population was reduced to about one

fourth of the total population.

These ratios show a decline compared with their

estimated value, 90 percent and one-half, respectively, for the beginning of
the century.

48

Both of these developments indicate growing internal ex-

change, independent of the increased trade generated between rural and urban
areas because of the expansion of foreign commerce, for the settled rural
population was probably less self-sufficient than the nomadic tribes, and,
of course, food had to be supplied for the larger urban population.

Neither

of these reasons necessarily implies commercial relations between the town
and the countryside since other systems of exchange could have performed
the same functions, but, as we shall try to demonstrate below, markets assumed
an ever-increasing role.
The rise in the foreign trade of Iran during the period roughly between
1850 and 1914 and the problems with measuring the change in the real volume
of trade have been dealt with in the first section of this paper.

Even if

we accept Professor Issawi's figures, which we claimed might underestimate
the actual expansion of trade, a quadrupling of the real volume of commodity
trade is a substantial increase.

The growth of Iran's foreign trade is not
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surprising in the light of contemporary developments; the opening up of
the Suez Canal, the fall in Ocean freight rates, the economic growth of
Europe and above all, the economic expansion of its northern neighbor,
Russia, which had accelerated in the last third of the nineteenth century.
Russia's index of industrial production had risen from the average of 13.5
in 1865-76 to 100 in the years 1905-1913, nearly doubling each decade.

49

According to Entner, the average value of Russo-Persian trade for the same
period increased from 7.7 million to 69.1 million gold rubles. 50

Because of

Entner's standard of measurement and the pattern of international price
movements, which we have discussed, the growth of trade was more gradual
than suggested by Entner, who attributes much of the increase to the period
after 1885.

Whatever the actual pattern of expansion within the period, it

is undeniable that between the mid-nineteenth century and the beginning of
the First World War, Russo-Persian commodity trade increased at a more rapid
rate than that of the total volume of the foreign trade of Iran.

By the end

of the period, Russia was by far the largest trading partner of Iran with a
commerce valued at nearly three times that of her nearest rival, Great
Britain.

51

The growth of the volume of trade during the last half of the century
is prima facie evidence of increasing commercialization, but more significant
was the change in the character of trade and its commodity composition.
When Russia and Great Britain replaced Afghanistan and the Ottoman Empire
as the main trading partners of Iran, transit trade through Iran, though
still of considerable value, declined relative to the nation's total foreign
commerce.

Neglecting this change in the nature of external trade while
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considering merely its total volume results in underrating the real impact
of the expansion of foreign transactions on the economic structure.

Clearly,

since an increasing portion of external trade was destined for exchange
within the country, the internal spread of conunercial relations was greater
than aggregate figures would suggest.
With the change in the final destination of trade, the commodity com
position was substantially altered.

Exports and re-exports of manufactured

goods declined relative to those of agricultural staples.

In a typical year

at the beginning of the twentieth century (1903-1904), the seven major agri
cultural commodities--namely, grains, cotton, wool, silk, opium, dried fruits
and gums--constituted about 85 percent of Iran's exports (excluding fish),
a figure which probably underestimates their true share due to the smuggling
of grains.

In the same year, Iran's imports were dominated by such items

for mass consumption as cotton cloth, sugar and tea, which together made up
about 60 percent of the volume of imports.

Compared to the composition of

trade at the beginning of the nineteenth century, these figures point to a
fundamental structural change in the economy quite similar to the process of
transformation occurring in most of the backward regions of the world as
they became increasingly integrated into the international economy.
The expansion of the volume of Iran's foreign conunerce and the modifi
cation of its structure provide convincing evidence for the assertion that
the impetus for the commercialization of agriculture came from without
rather than from internal development.

This point is particularly well

illustrated by the nature of the growing Russo-Persian trade.

The economic

relation between Iran and Russia, which was itself only a semi-industrial

r
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nation, was one of hinterland to center.

Industrial production expanded

in the center while the hinterland was opened up as a supplier of raw
materials and a market for the products of the growing industries.

Rus

sian merchants played a direct role in encouraging the production of such
items as cotton, wool and grains destined for Russian markets.

52

At the

same time, the expansion of the.Russian railway network, improved naviga
tion in the Caspian, and better roads in northern Iran (built mostly by
Russian concessionaries) helped to integrate the two markets.

Because the

other European nations, especially Great Britain, were more advanced in
dustrially, Russian goods, in particular textiles and sugar, could not
initially compete effectively and had to be subsidized.

Such export

bounties were not designed merely to enable Russian textiles and sugar to
undersell those from other industrial nations, an objective achieved as
Russia gradually gained a larger share of these markets in Iran.

53

At

times, Russia adopted subsidization for the express purpose of discouraging
industrial production within Iran; in the most notorious incident, Russia
temporarily exported sugar to Iran at artificially low prices to bring
about the bankruptcy of the modern sugar mill established there in 1895.
Until the beginnings of the twentieth century, commercial relations
between the two countries were governed by the Treaty of Turkamanchai.
As Russian industry matured and an infrastructure for trade developed,
and since geographical proximity made the two countries one another's
natural trading partners, Russia realized that the provisions of the
treaty did not serve its best interests.

In 1903 a new customstreaty

went into effect, replacing the old ad valorem import and export tax of
5 percent by a more complicated tariff schedule which generally favored
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Russian goods over imports from other countries and eliminated the Iranian
export tax.

54

The removal of the export tax on Iran's raw materials,

ostensibly to increase their volumes and to redress the unfavorable
balance of trade, clearly demonstrates the dependence of Iran's agricul
tural exports on the Russian market.

The tax in effect represented a

monopoly rent for the Iranian government, and Russia pressed for the
elimination of the duty as it recognized its own monopsonist position-
the Iranian peasant was a "captive seller" who could not easily turn to
other markets.
The growth of trade, which, as we have argued above, was tied to
economic expansion abroad, took place in the context of improvements in the
infrastructure for commerce, such as the transportation and communication
network or the economic and legal market institutions.

Despite Anglo

Russian rivalry which impeded the construction of railroads in Iran,
part of the changes in the transportation and communication system was
initiated and undertaken by foreign interests.

Political considerations

by Britain and Russia might have delayed the development of the network,
but once started, competition betwE?en the two nations stimulated invest
ment as each tried to match any advantage gained by the other.

As a

.result, the process became cumulative, the expansion of trade and infra
structure reinforcing one another over time.
Revolutions in the means of transport, chiefly the expansion of rail
roads and steam shipping, which occurred outside the borders of the coun
try, were certainly decisive factors in integrating Iran intb the world
economic system.

Within Iran, no such developments took place, although

many fruitless attempts were made to obtain concessions to build railways.
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The most notable change in the transport system of the country was the
introduction of shipping in the Karun during the 1880's, and the construction of a few carriageable roads, usually by foreign concessionaires,
in the last decade of the nineteenth and the early years of the twentieth
century.

(During the First World War, the British military forces built

some roads for motor transport.)

Despite the use of carts on these roads

which joined Teheran with the North and the southwestern trading routes,
pack animals remained the basic means of transportation of merchandise
(and mule tracks the main road system) until the eve of the First World
War.

Practically all commentators stress the difficulty of moving goods

and people within the country, the time involved, the monetary cost and
the insecurity.

55

No doubt, such observations were correct, for trans-

portation was expensive and risky.

However, the rate and the direction

of change rather than the absolute level of costs is the relevant factor
to consider for our analysis of the extension of markets.

Again, the

usual problems with Iranian data, the absence of consistent long time
series of freight rates and of a corresponding index of general level of
prices, precludes definitive statements regarding the long-term trends in
the real cost of transportation.

We think it reasonable to maintain that

over time such costs must have declined.

The introduction of wheeled

traffic might have been a causal factor, though not a significant one.
A more appreciable reduction in cost probably was brought about by the
growth in the volume of trade itself.

Certainly with modern transportation

systems, there are large economies of scale, average cost declining as the
scale of operation grows.

One might think that with the means of trans

port employed in Iran during this period, such economies of scale were
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negligible, but convincing arguments can be made for the existence of
substantial returns to scale.

Certain overhead costs were fixed in the

network for the provision of the needs of the caravans, the construction
and the upkeep of caravansarai, stocking a minimum supply of fodder and
food, and the expenses of forwarding agents in the commercial centers.
The rise in the volume of trade and, more importantly, the increased
frequency of joumeys, which would have reduced waiting time, must have
lowered the average cost.

Increased security of the roads was even more

significant in cheapening of transportation.

On the more travelled routes,

such as the Enzeli Teheran Road, banditry had practically disappeared, at
least during normal times.

The trend was general not only because the

increased authority of the central government provided protection but
also because larger caravans could better afford to employ a larger body
of private guards.

At times of political turmoil, freight rates would

rise, but over the course of the period, such instability was gradually
confined to the more remote regions of the country. 56

Thus, though the

time required to ship goods between regions did not decline appreciably,
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the real cost of transpor
tation declined.

(Incidentally, a factor in spreading commercialization

into rural areas was the provision of supplies required by the growing
traffic.

A major portion of the needs of the muleteers, their food,

forage for the animals and animals themselves, were purchased from
fanners or nomadic tribes.

Since freight rates appear to have been

sensitive to fluctuations in the price of forage, much of the expendi
ture of transportation must eventually have ended up in the rural sector.)
In contrast to the absence of dramatic, visible changes in the
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transportation system, Iran's conununications network was markedly improved
during the second half of the nineteenth century.

Although a rudimentary

postal system was established as early as 1851, it was only in the mid1870's that a regular postal service was instituted, and in 1877 Iran
joined the international Postal Union.

Regular weekly services existed

between Teheran and main Iranian cities, and a fortnightly service pro
vided mail connection with Europe.

Although the postal service, like

other public services, was farmed out until 1901, the network expanded,
and the number of post offices grew from 60 in 1881 to 224 in 1918. 57
The establishment of the postal system greatly reduced the time required
to send mail and small packages between cities, demonstrated by the fol
lowing table from Rabino (circa 1890).
Table 4
Distance in Miles

Days Journey
by Post

Days Journey
by Caravan

Tabriz

350

4

17

Resht

200

3

10

Meshhed

558

8

24

245

4

12

Shiraz

530

8

27

Bushire

700

13

37

Yezd

412

8

21

Kerman

640

12

32

Ramadan

200

3

9

Kermanshah

330

5

14

From Teheran to:

Isphahan

Source:

J. Rabino, "Banking in Persia."
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The original impetus for the construction of a telegraphic network
in Iran came from the British government, which was eager to establish
speedy communication with India.

Agreements were reached in the mid-

1860's, but once the initial lines were in operation, the system expanded
rapidly, and by the end of the century the network covered most of the
Iranian territory in addition to serving its original function of con
necting India with Europe.

The stimulus for the fast growth came partly

from the Iranian government's recognition of the utility of the telegraphic
network.

Therefore, it was willing to invest in and to grant concessions

for new lines.

By 1876, there were already over 4,000 kilometers of

telegraphic lines joining 46 offices within Iran; by 1904, 9,640 kilometers
connected 130 localities.

58

The improvements in the communications system had far-reaching effects
'

on the political unification of the country, greatly enhancing the authority
of the central government, but they also had a profound economic impact.
Commercial exchange was expedited, and by the beginning of the present
century, one may speak of an integrated national market in Iran.

Both ·the

postal and the telegraphic networks were used extensively for the dissemina
tion of commercial intelligence, the transmission of purchase or sale orders,
59
and the remittance of funds.

The extension of the system into a region

usually stimulated commercial activity there.

Lieutenant Vaughan in his

Report of Journey through Persia records that, "Since the introduction of
1160
telegraph and post office, Yezd has become an important center of trade •..
Merchants were, of course, very much aware of the necessity for quick
61
communications and promoted the expansion of the system. A further factor aiding the growing commercializati on of the economy
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was the reform of the monetary system.

In 1877, the various provincial

mints were abolished, and the issuance of the currency was centralized in
Teheran.

More significantly, in 1889 the Imperial Bank of Persia was

established under a concession granted to a British company and was given
the exclusive right to issue bank notes.

Soon after, a private Russian

bank began operations, and later the Imperial Ottoman Bank opened several
branches in Iran.

The network of modern banks spread fairly rapidly, but

though the foreign-owned banking sector provided stiff competition for the
informal indigenous money market, it was not able to eliminate it alto
gether.

Even before the creation of the Imperial Bank, the wealthier

merchants and moneylenders (sarrafs) had created their own financial
instruments, and funds could be transferred between cities and even inter
nationally with relative ease.

We have already mentioned the banking

operations of Haji Amin-0-Zarb, but other also engaged in such activities.
Millspaugh estimated that at the time of his first missions, there were
five Persian merchants with credit ranging from 10 to SO million Krans,
who bought and sold bills on the provinces and whose notes were generally
acceptable.

Surely, many more had operations limited to specific regions.

Although ultimately the domination of the financial sector by foreign
banks was detrimental to the interests of the country, competition from
foreign banks initially aided regional commercial activity.

As the notes

of the Imperial Bank drove out of national circulation the notes of the
Iranian sarrafs, the latter had to rechannel their capital from financing
63
national and international trade to providing funds for local use.
The legal and administrative framework for the conduct of business-•
codes and procedures for enforcement of commercial contacts and for

62
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recovery of debts in bankruptcy cases--remained practically unchanged.
Although foreign merchants, in particular Russian and British, enjoyed
capitulatory rights and usually had the support of their consuls in pressing
for their claims, foreigners complained frequently about dishonesty of
Iranian merchants and agents, fraudulent bankruptcies, and the corruption
and complicity of Iran officials in such matters. 64

No doubt, Iranian

merchants were not always scrupulous in their dealings with foreigners
or with each other, but the charges of fraud are exaggerated.

Limited

markets, frequent natural disasters, the underdeveloped state of capital
markets, and the size of their assets made Iranian merchants vulnerable;
most bankruptcies were indeed genuine failures and were, at times, recog
nized as such by foreign consuls.

65

The difficulties in collecting debts

reflected the lack of continuity in commercial relations rather than
the absence of an elaborate legal and administative machinery.

Even at

present, in highly industrial and m.arket oriented economies, a company
going out of business usually finds it hard to collect its debts.

So,

when Consul Jones complains about difficulties experienced in collecting
rooney from the debtors of a British firm after it left Tabreez, he was
not describing conditions peculiar to Iran. 66

As one would expect with

the growth in the vollllne of trade, better communications, and increasing
prospects for commercial relations on a more regular basis, the standards
of honesty improved even without the introduction of fonnal legislation.
A British report in 1894 on Shiraz stated that Iranian merchants were
becoming more trustworthy and " ••• the proportion of trade bills returned
unpaid being certainly not more than the case in any provincial town in
England ••• " and that " ••. native merchants are less reluctant than formerly
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1167
to break their contracts and repudiate their engagements •••

The expansion of commercial activity

enhanced the taxing power of

the government since the decline in regional self-sufficiency allowed the
government to extract taxes at points of exchange.

Because channels of

foreign trade were less numerous, it was more easily taxed.

Iranian

merchants also had to pay road taxes and town octrois, but these dues
yielded much smaller revenue than the customs duties.

Especially in the

first decade of the twentieth century, attempts were made to impose taxes
on or monopolize the trading of other items of exchange,· like tobacco,
opium and alcohol, even though a previous effort to establish a tobacco
regie under a foreign concession in 1890 had backfired on the government.
Despite a fairly steady growth of the receipts from these diverse areas,
state income was primarily from land revenue and customs duties, with the
latter becoming increasingly dominant after the 1890's.

Although the

rate of taxation of foreign trade was not changed until 1903, and even
then not appreciably, the government was able to collect more because
the volume of trade was expanding and because its concentration allowed
centralized collection.

68

The increase in the taxing capacity, which the

growing trade permitted, was not at first effectively exploited, at least
for the benefit of the central government.

As late as 1888-1889, out of

the total receipts of nearly 54.5 Krans, only 8 million Krans were from
customs revenue.

We suspect, however, that both the informal pishkeshes

(the gift offered to the shah or other high officials at the time of the
assignment of offices) from the farmers of the customs and their operating
69
. .
pro fi ts were rising.

Rabino estimates that before the administration

of customs was centralized, customs revenue was only between two and three
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percent of the value of foreign trade.

70

At the time of Shuster's

mission (1911), this income had risen to over thirty-four million Krans,
representing about four percent of the value of trade, while the land tax
revenues had remained practically constant.

71

The trend continued, and by

the time Millspaugh took over the financial administration of Iran, customs
receipts (for the fiscal year 1922-23) had doubled again and now constituted
over five percent of the foreign trade (excluding oil); land revenue had
risen only about 20 percent.

72

Since the customs treaty of 1903 had removed the export levies, the
trade tax was mainly in the form of an import tariff.

In the absence of

even approximate data on the consumption pattern of the peasantry and
other sections of the population, it is hard to assess the incidence of
the taxation, but this modification of the tax structure was probably
favorable to the peasantry.

Some of this advantage was gradually lost

when various agricultural and livestock products--for instance, opium,
tobacco, skins, s'laughter of animals--were again taxes or monopolized by
the state.
Despite all these developments, there is a tendency to discount their
direct impact upon the rural areas, for villages and tribes have been
regarded as essentially stagnant societies, predominantly self-sufficien t
and in little need of trade with other communities.

Even recently,

I ran. 73
•
.
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Ac-

cording to this position, which is influeced by Marx's comments on Asian
societies, the extraction of surplus from the rural areas was in kind, and
the landlord or government official transferred the surplus physically to
urban areas whence it entered commercial exchange.

Consequently, the
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villagers themselves were not directly engaged in the money economy or in
commodity exchange with the outside world; within the village, division of
labor and exchange supposedly was not based upon monetary transactions.
The fragmentation of the society into many relatively independent units
caused the lack of progress.

74

Although at the beginning of the nineteenth

century, many rural communities in Iran might have fitted this description,
by the end of the century, the typical village was quite different.

There

are numerous indications that direct monetary exchange became prevalent
during the course of the century, and that the rural sector was increas
ingly drawn, through a system of commercial relations, into the wider
regional and national markets, and, ultimately~ into the international
economy.
Examples of monetary sales of agricultural and livestock products
Such sales often involved direct contact between merchants and

abound.

peasants, though at times purchases were made from landowners not residing
in villages.

Stack, who visited Iran in 1882, reports that Yazdi merchants

would go as far as Zarand, about a week's journey, to advance money to
opium growers in return for the purchase of their harvest.

He also re

counts the interest shown by peasants near Isfahan in the prices and trade
of opium.

75

Russian and Persian traders encouraged the cultivation of

American cotton by providing seed and cash to farmers in the North, espe
cially in Khorasan.

They also sent their agents into the countryside to

procure wool from nomads, sometimes making payments before the herds were
clipped.

76

Rabino's description of silk and tobacco growing and trade in

Ghilan provide further examples of commercialized agriculture.

77

Despite

these examples, market transactions were not confined to cash crops like
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opium, cotton, silk and tobacco.

Grains also entered trade, not only for

domestic consumption but also for exports.

Indeed, at the beginning of

the twentieth century, even without taking smuggling into consideration,
Iran exported more grains, mainly rice, to Russia than raw cotton.

After

the decline in the silk production in Ghilan, there was a shift to rice
and wheat cultivation for Russian markets. 78

Contemporary observers in-

dicate that considerable direct business existed between grain merchants
and peasants.

The British vice consul from Mashad reported in 1896 that

grain speculators were able to procure wheat cheaply because they did
not buy in the town, but went to the villages and often made cash advances
before the harvest.

H. L. Rabino noted a government prohibition, imposed

to combat hoarding, which forbade produce merchants' (allafs) going to the
rural areas of Rasht to purchase rice. 79
Like the settled rural population, nomadic tribes engaged in commer
cial activity.

They found a ready market for their livestock products, es

pecially butter, wool and hides, and, to some extent, for live animals.
The expansion of the rug weaving industry in the last decades of the nine
teenth century increased the market for their wool and, of course, the
tribes themselves wove and sold their rugs and gilims.

Because of their

migratory way of life, nomads probably had infrequent contact with commer
cial centers and marketed their produce when they passed near such towns
during the course of their migration.

For instance, Boroojen, in the

vicinity of Isphahan, is reported by Al-Isphahani to have been a trading
center for the Turkish and Lur tribes.

Mirza Hossain Khan, in his book,

Jughaphiaye Isphahan, mentions that many tribes came during summer months.
to the neighbourhood of Isphahan and traded in the city and villages
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" ••• bringing sheep and taking back cash, cloth and other goods. 1180
The extent of the spread of markets into rural areas is also demon
strated by the responsiveness of peasants and landlords to economic incen
tives.

This sensitivity to market forces is reflected not only in long

term rise or decline of various crops but also in shorter term shifts
between crops.

The much-discussed expansion of opium trade was clearly

due to economic factors; indeed, the government sometimes had to legislate
against increases in opium production.

Zil-01-Sultan, for instance, ordered

that one acre of wheat be grown for every four acres of opium; at times,
planting of certain crops was pranoted through tax exemptions.
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The

rise in cotton production and exports in response to the price increases
during the American Civil War, and the temporary decline before the rapid
expansion towards the end of the nineteenth century are well-documented
instances of market influence.

Dickson, the secretary to the British

Legation, reported in 1865, that the export of cotton from Southern Persia
had increased five fold since 1862-1863.

In 1873 a British report esti

mated the rise of cotton exports from Southern Iranian ports during the
American Civil War, " ••• from next to nothing to 100,000 bales annually ••. ",
while at the time of the report, export of cotton had practically ceased.
Although much smaller in magnitude, the same process appears to have been
repeated in Azerbayejan where cotton production expanded rapidly during
the War when prices increased sev~ral fold, but dropped after 1866 when
foreign prices declined and difficulties were experienced in marketing
the cotton.
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Less spectacula~ but just as indicative of responses to

economic forces, are cases of expansion of minor crops in specific regions
such as the cultivation of tobacco in Ghilan, where cigarette tobacco was
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introduced in the mid 1870's.

In 1877 about 43 thousand kilograms were

harvested, and by 1891 the output had grown to over 450,000 kilograms--an
increase of over ten-fold.

After this date, cultivation of tobacco continued

to grow but at a slower pace and fluctuated according to market price.
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Contemporary observers were well aware of the relevance of profitability
in farmers' decisions to grow particular crops.

In 1891, a British consular

report for Mashad stated that "The people of Turbat-i-Haidari also have begun
to cultivate saffron, as they find it more remunerative than cotton."

A

later report from the same area recorded, " ••• two or three years ago opium
had become so cheap that it hardly paid the cultivators, and that in con
seuqence the area cultivated began to diminish.
begun to buy up the drug ••. l'he

but, now the merchants have

recultivation has begun with renewed energy."

Al-Isphahan, himself a merchant, observed in the 1880's, how the amount of
cotton produced in the vicinity of Isphahan varied each year depending on
its price.

He also attributed the decline in the cultivation of tobacco to

the import tariff imposed on it in the Ottoman Empire, the chief market for
Iranian tobacco.
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Clearly, the examples in the last two paragraphs demon-

strate that the connnonly accepted views of the conservative, self-sufficient
peasant that prevails to this day had no foundation in facts.
The rise of commercial agriculture is also indicated by the increase
in pre-harvest sales of crops, either bv peasants or landlords.
already refered to merchants making cash advances.

We have

Arrangements for such

loans were diverse and complicated, though they often involved debtors
pledging to sell produce to a creditor at a fixed price or at the prevailing
market price at harvest time.

In other cases, the crop was used as a

security on the loan, and the debtor could simply pay back the loan together
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85
.
i h t h e accrued interest.
wt

The implicit or explicit rate of interest on

such cash advances was at times, usurious, hut such loans differed in nature
86
Firstlv, such
from the usury to which the peasantry was often subjected.
credit arrangements were not necessarily between the landlords and peasants,
though the former did occasionallv act as intermediaries.

Instead,thev

were the beginnings of more competitive and impersonal capital markets.
Secondly, landlords as well as peasants were recipients of the cash advances.
Thirdly, the willingness of merchants to make these credits available on the
security of the crops indicated the marketability of agricultural products.
Traders were, presumably, more iwlling to make advances on crops whose prices
were relatively stable, like cotton and opium.

Finally, pre-harvest sales on

the part of the farmers reflected their need for cash.

Such funds were used

in a variety of ways depending on who obtained them, but even if the poorer
peasants spent the money on food such purchase would indicate monetary ex
change in the rural areas.
A neglected aspect of expansion of market exchange into rural areas is
the change in the cahracter of rural handicrafts.

Some of the non-food re

quirements of the rural population were, surelv, produced locally.

Whether

or not such handicraft production declined in the villages, as it did in
the towns, is difficult to estahlish--quit e possiblv, it did.

An excentional

development was the growth of rug weaving, much of which was done by women
and children in villages.

The rise of this "cottage industrv" after the mid-

nineteenth centurv is well known.
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For the rural areas, expansion of rug

weaving meant changing the orientation of handicraft activities from meeting
local needs to producin?- for markets.

Besides rugs, other rural crafts were

sometimes undertaken for sale in the towns.

Writing about Isphahan, the
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British Consul reported in 1892 that "The women in the village [Haft Taher1
were all employed in making P,ivas [a native Iranian cloth shoe] .•. These
givas are taken to Yazd and Isphahan for sale, during harvest time, some 15
88
pairs are made daily, in winter about 25 pairs~
Provision of wage labor is another facet of the integration of the rural
population into the national economy.

Historicall y, large-scale migration,

primarily motivated by political and military factors, had been fairly common
in Iran.

The distinguish ing characteris tic of the population movement in

the late nineteenth or early twentieth century is its responsiven ess to
economic factors.

Many references can be found to short-term movements of

peasants, either to the cities to take up non-agricu ltural jobs (mainly
in constructio n) or to other rural areas to seek agricultura l employment.
In some villages, outside casual laborers provided wage labor, usually at
harvest time, and were paid in cash or kind.

in
Estimates of H.L. Rabino
#

dicate that each year more than 25 thousand Khalkhali peasants went to Rasht
to work during the fall and winter but returned to Khalkhal for the beginning
of their own agricultura l season.

He also reported that the [lazy] Guilak

peasant would employ a mozdour (paid laborer) whenever he could afford it.
The road projects undertaken between 1890 and 1920 offered many employment
For instance, 30 thousand laborers were employed by the
- -90
British in 1920 to keep the Kerm~nshah- Teheran road clear.

opportuniti es.

An increasingl y important component of the wage labor force was the
Iranian migratory worker who went to Russia to be employed in factories or
to build railroads.

The magnitude of such movements, which appear to have

been short-term migrations rather than permanent emigration, are indeed

89
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striking.

Entner estimates that in the first decade of the present century

between 60 thousand and 100 thousand Iranians annually entered Russia and
about an equal number returned.

During the years immediately preceding

the War, these numbers had more than doubled.
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In addition to these direct indications of the extension of commercial
relations into rural areas, we can point to other manifestations of an en
larged sphere of market exchange.

The money obtained from the sale of

products had to be spent; the pattern of its expenditure is relevant to
our argument.

Some of the proceeds went for in taxes either by the landlords

or the peasants, but the magnitude of sales of agriculture products for the
domestic markets and for exports far exceeded the tax revenue of the govern
ment.

A large share of the money was probably left in the hands of landlords

and merchants, but some must have remained with the peasants to he spent by
them on consumer goods.

Unfortunately, we have little direct information

on the consumption habits or living standards of the peasantry, yet indirect
evidence suggests that at least some consumed beyond the bare minimum of
food and clothing and that part of the goods they consumed was purchased.
The main items of consumption were tea, sugar and cotton cloth, and the data
on the imports of such products indicate that their use must have been wide
spread, not merely confined to the urban areas.

During the first decade of

this century, sugar imports into Iran ranged between 75 thousand and 120
thousand tons annually, which implies a per capita consumption of between
7.4 kilograms and 12 kilograms, approximately equal to the rate of consumption
in Grate Britain in the 1840's.

Since the urban population was only about

2 million, it appears unlikely that the entire amount was consumed in the
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cities, especially when we note that the vast majority of the city dwellers
were not much better off than the peasantry.
repeated for cotton

cloth and tea.
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The same argument can be

Consumption of such items was apparently

common among the majority of the peasantry.

A British Consul connnenting on

the poverty of Sistan, impli~d the prevalence of such purchases in the more
prosperous areas, when he observed, "The people are so wretchedlv poor that
there is no demand for these things.
drink tea. 119

They make their own cloths and don't

3

In many villages, there were shops which catered to the needs of the
94
people and permanent traders acted as buying agents for city merchants.
In the more thickly populated Caspian region, regular weekly markets were
held where peasants could sell their produce and purchase consumer goods,
while in other regions, itinerant merchants (Pilevars) took such products as
tea, sugar and cloth to villages and tribal areas.

Some of these sales were

for cash, but part of the trading appears to have been barter where no monev
changed hands, the traders providing credit to be repaid in produce after
the harvest.

Yet, even the barter deals essentially involved commodity ex

change in the Marxian sense.
buy and sell goods.

The villagers and tribesmen went into towns to

Al-Isphahani mentions a bazaar in Ishpahan called

Najafabadi since the inhabitants of this region brought their khoshkebar
(dried furits and nuts) there to sell. Mirza Hossain Khan describes the guild
of the sellers of ready-made clothes in Isphahan, whose chief customers
were the tribe.
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(Incidentally, a major expenditure item for tribes was

probably arms and ammunition which they bought in the cities).
The underestimation of the extent of market participation by the rural
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population is perhaps partly due to the tendency to regard the rural social
structure as homogeneous and to make a sharp demarcation between landlords
and peasants.

In fact, the situation was more complex.

In certain areas,

there were small holders, usually better off than tenants, and even on the
estates of large landlords, the internal social structure was hierarchical.
Representative of landlords and certain village officials enjoved special
privileges.

Some villagers were more prosperous than others by virtue of

owning draught animals; at the bottom of the scale were landless laborers,
distinguished from share-croppers.

The existence of social differentiation

within villages and between regions implied differences in consumption
patterns.

The more prosperous elements, whose living standards still left

much to be desired, consumed other goods besides grain and homespun cloth.
Increased availability of Western products probablv first enticed this section
of the population to produce for the market and to look outside the villap,e
for the satisfaction of their wants.

To the extent that the decline in the

economic and political autonomy of villages produced a more hierarchical
structure, as we may conjecture, the process of commercialization would have
been accelerated.
A consequence of the increased commercialization of agriculture was the
growth of investment in land by the merchant class.

Apart from the social

prestige of land ownership, several economic reasons explained the heightened
interest shown by merchants in acquiring landed property.

Firstlv, the

orientation of agriculture to cash crops, made land a more attractive
commercial asset; outsiders like merchants, were better able to assess its
value, and the risk of owning land was reduced because access to international
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trade meant less volatile markets.

Both these factors provided merchants

with more opportunities for diversification of their assets, for the relative
attractiveness of land as an investment had been enhanced.

Secondly, during

the reign of both Nasir-al .-Din Shah and his successor, the state began to
sell its khaliseh land (stat-e domain) and, presumably, merchants with liquid
funds managed to purchase some of these properties at bargain prices. 96
Thirdly, the acquisition of land by merchants was, in part, involuntary.

The

extravagant lifestyle of the large landlords and the "nobilitv" with their
newly acquired tastes and habits required cash outlays which they could not
97
always make.
Even though they possessed considerable assets, they often
faced liquidity problems and had to turn to merchants to borrow.

Land was

usually put up as collateral for such loans and in the cases where they
could not pay their debts their land would pass into the hands ,of the merchant
class.

Despite these developments favoring acquisition of land by this

group, with few exceptions, merchants did not join the ranks of the large
landlords until after the period under consideration here.

They tended to

acquire villages near their place of residence not only because control was
easier but also because their location near towns guaranteed ready access
to markets.

At times, such properties also served the dual function of pro

viding summer homes.

Merchants like Amin-0-Zarb, who had large holdings,

usually consolidated these in particular regions.

It is safe to conclude

that although land was becoming more of a "commodity" itself, the difficulties
of communication still made its market limited. 98
In describing the transformation of the rural sector, we have neglected
the changes that occurred in urban areas.

In fact, they were closely related
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and the modifications in the nature of the urban economy mirrored the de
velopments of the rural sector.

The structure that emerged was the natural

consequence of an externally imposed change.

We have already provided

support for such an assertion in our discussion of Russo-Persian trade and
Iran's commercial relations with other industrial nations were similar.
These dependent and unequal relationships had created a lop-sided structure
within cities which, gradually deprived of their own industry, became centers
of bureaucracy and trade where merchants acted as intermediaries between the
rural sector and the international

economy.

The competition from Western

goods had undermined handicrafts, although certain artisans tried to imitate
Western production, without large scale output and introduction of machinery,
such attempts were futile.

The expansion of the carpet industry was no sub

stitute for the wide range of manufacturing that was partly eliminated.

Both

this industry and others catering to the West, such as shawl weaving in
Attempts to mechanize

Kerman, were not suitable for capitalist expansion.

would have destroyed the raison dretre of these industries.
III
From our brief descriptions and analysis of the structural changes that
occurred in Iran a reasonably clear picture emerges.

By the first decade

of the present century, we can no longer characterize Iranian agriculture
as subsistence farming.

By then, it was well integrated into the national

economy and commercial relations were widespread.
farming persisted:

Many features of subsistence

rents in kind were still prevalent; the landlord-peasan t

relationship did not become simply one of employer to employee, and many non-
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market considerations continued to bind them to one another; large nHmhers
of peasants had little or no marketable surplus.

These characteristics

of the rural economy remained largelv unchanged even after 1921, for in the
years between the World Wars the government concentrated its efforts on
industrializati on.

But the direction of change was unmistakeable.

Increased

conunercializati on and regional specialization had alreadv laid the foundation
for the introduction of cash rents and wages.

The expansion of the market

system had naturally produced unequal development and magnified income and
wealth inequalities both within and among regions.

Most significantly, larr,er

volumes of external and internal commercial interchange had shifted the basis
of the fiscal system, permitting greater political and economic integration
of the countrv.
These developments came to a virtual halt during the decade 1910-1920
as political and military events within Iran and outside its horders disrupted
commerce, hut this slow-down was quickly reversed once normal conditions
were restored.

The reforms that the government instituted after the coup

basically involved the political unification of the country throuP,h the
establishment of a strong central government.

The prerequisite for the

centralization of authority was the command over economic resources to maintain
a bureaucracy and an army.

The gradual economic changes of the 60 vears

preceding the coup, bv creating a fairly integrated national economv, nrovided
the government with the basis to easilv acquire the financial power.

As

we mentioned previously increased exchange enhanced the fiscal capacitv of
the government and permitted geographical separation of political and economic
power from productive activity.

A large surplus could be extracted and snent

-49-

wherever desired, whatever its place of origin.

When the government

attempted to reform the· fiscal system after the coup,scant attention was
paid to obtaining larger revenues from the land.

Instead the government

concentrated on taxing items that entered national or international market
exchange.

Budget estimates for.1926-1927 indicate that revenue from these

sources constituted about 80 percent of government receipts (excluding
revenue from the oil concessions, which were just beginning to expand).

By then, the volume of internal and external trade was large enough that,
even without an unduely high rate of taxation, government finances could
be placed on a relatively sound footing.

The developments that occurred

during the reign of Raza Shah further integrated the national economy, in
creasing internal exchange and reducing the dependence of agricultural
exports of certain regions on particular markets.

Government reforms and

programs were certainly responsible for the greater economic and political
unification of the country, but conditions for their effectiveness had been
initiated by the gradual economic transformations that had been taking place
prior to their institution.

APPENDIX ON SOURCES

This short appendix is not intended as a bibliographical essay on the
•
writings and primary source material on nineteenth century Iranian economic
history.

Its purpose is rather to point out the principal deficiencies in

the source materials used by most students of the subject, ourselves not
excluded, and to explain why there still remain substantial areas for dis
agreement among historians of the period.
Primary sources in the Western languages consist mainly of foreign
travellers' accounts of Iran, memoirs of Western "experts" and envoys
residing in Iran over fairly extended periods of time and, perhaps most
importantly, regular consular reports and diplomatic correspondence.

Over

the course of the century, as contacts became more numerous, the amount of
such material increased.

Recourse to many of these sources entails recog~

nizing certain inherent biases.

Firstly, many of the recorded observations

do not provide independent information since writers frequently drew upon
material from their predecessors.

Secondly, as we have already mentioned

in our text, the economic and political developments of the West must have
gradually changed the vantage point of Western observers of Iran.

Thirdly,

one naturally finds excessive concern with foreign trade; consular staffs
were especially preoccupied with the re_lative competitiveness of their
own national goods with other foreign merchandise.

In this context, it

is not surprising that the internal economic affairs of Iran, except insofar
as they touch upon external trade, received scant attention.
Persian primary sources which remain undestroyed are as yet.rela
tively unexplored.

Much of what is still available is scattered and

ordinarily not easily accessible to scholars.

A notable exception is the

collection of the papers of Haji-Amin-O-Zarb which promises an unequalled
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record of the economic and social history of Iran during the last three
decades of the century.

Personal diaries and memoirs, whose publication

has expanded recently, are generally more relevant to the political his
tory of the country.

Many secondary sources exist in Persian, and of

these the most useful to economic analysts are the histories of particular
regions or cities rather than the general history books.

Much of the in

formation contained in such works tends to be unsystemati c, non-quantit ative
and without reference to the source, all of which diminish their value.
In addition to the paucity of data, the problems of economic historians
of Iran are compounded by the conflicting information obtained from various
sources.

Some of the contradictio ns may be explained by the diversity in

the condition of the different regions.

They do, however, also reflect

the biases of the writers and the simple misinformat ion provided to the
foreigners by their informants, for language difficultie s often added to
the hazards of gathering information .

Another possible explanation of

the differences is the periodic occurrence of natural disasters causing
short-term fluctuation s in the conditions of the country.

To contemporar y

observers not very familiar with Iran, immediate situations might have
been mistaken for longer term states of affairs.
The relatively undeveloped state of the economic history of Iran can
be explained mainly by the difficultie s in obtaining reliable and systematic
data.

Before attempts can be made to write a general economic history,

more detailed research has to be done not only on histories of the different
regions of Iran but also on specific economic sectors and industries.

In

the absence of such work, valid generalizat ion will be rare, and there will
be ample ground for genuine differences which do not merely reflect the
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ideological biases of the writers.

The conclusions of this paper are no

exception to the caveat; they are not meant to be taken as established
truth but as suggestive hypotheses.

NOTES
*This is a revised version of a paper given
at the "Conferen ce of the Economic History
of the Near East" held at Princeton Universit y,
June 1974. We are grateful to Lucy Cardwell
and Ian Parker for their helpful suggestio ns.
We also wish to thank Stephen Ault for his
editorial assistanc e.
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pp. 54-60; C. Issawi, op. cit., pp. 128-135; and E.B.Yaganegi, Recent Financial
and Monetary History of Persia (New York, 1934), Chapter 5. Exceptions to
the general assertion concerning the deficit can be found for certain years.
For example, the British consul in Tabriz reported, "For several years past,
Persia has not been obliged to export specie to pay for her imports •.. On
the contrary, foreign merchants have found it advantageous of late years
to import bullion ... " See, Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Papers
(Commons), 1888, CII, C.5252, "Diplomatic and Consular Reports on Trade and
Finance, No. 241. Persia. Tabreez," Hereafter, reference to Great Britain,
Parliament, will be omitted when citing Parliamentary Papers,and "Diplomatic
and Consular Reports on Trade and Finance" will be abbreviated as DCRTF.
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References to such prohibitions are frequently encountered; for
example, consult Parliamentary Papers (Commons), 1867-68, LXIX, No. 3954-IV,
"Report ••• on the Population, Revenue, Military Force, and Trade of Persia"
or Parliamentary Papers (Commons), 1873, LXV, C.828, "Persia. Tabreez."
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9

This point, though not p,enerally recognized, has been previouslv made
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Parliamentary Papers (Commons), _!.887, LXXV, C.4923-36,"DCRTF, No. 113.
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op. cit., p. 82.
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examples, see the following: Parliamentary Papers (Commons), 1897, C.8277,
"DCRTF, No. 1800. Persia.Meshed,-"; and Parliamentary Papers (Commons),
1883, LXXIV, C. 3798, "DCRTF, No. 760. Persia. Bushire.";
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While the above refer to bans on the export of grains, other foodstuffs
were also banned. For example, for reports of export bans on sheep and
butter, see: U.S., Department of State, General Records of the Department
of State, RG58 (National Archives Microfilm Pualications, T305), Consular
Despatches, Teheran, 1883-1906, Despatch from the U.S. Consul in Teheran,
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Again we refer the reader to British consular reports; for example,
Consul-General Abbott records, " ... foreign gold and silver flow into the
country in very diminished quantities since the failure of the silk. In
creased difficulty is, therefore, experienced in procuring the means of·
remittance to Europe," in Parliamentary Papers (Commons), 1867-68, LXVI-f,
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16

For a table of legal and actual weight and fineness of the Kran,
see J. :Rabino, "Banking in Persia," p. 31. The 1879 reduction in the legal
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If there was any mismanagement, corruption, or simple ineptitude in
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